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DIES, MARTIN (1900-1972)

!

McCarthy. Dies was not appointed to HUAC. He left
Congress in 1959, but continued his devotion to the
antico1nmunist cause as a dedicated 1ne1nber of the
John Birch society. He died in 1972.
KAREN BRUNER
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DISCIPLINING LAWYERS FOR
SPEAKING ABOUT PENDING CASES
Lawyers sometimes believe that it is important to
influence public opinion as part of the representation
of a client. Perhaps the aim is to present a favorable
case to:l potential jurors, or perhaps the client is a
public figure whose reputation may be affected by
the outcome of the proceedings. In any event, when
lawyers discuss a pending case at a news conference or
n1ake staten1ents to reporte1:s, these extrajudicial co1n1nents 1nay have a negative hnpact on the fain1ess of
the trial process. Courts and bar associations therefore seek to limit speech concerning pending cases.
These li1nitations pose a conflict between two constitutional rights: the First Amendment press-freedom
guarantee and the litigants' right to a fair trial, protected by the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has tried to balance these rights.
After a inid-century trial acco1npanied by a media
frenzy, the Court grm1ted a writ of habeas corpus
sought by a doctor who had allegedly killed his wife,
on the grounds that the publicity prevented him from
receiving a fair trial (Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 1969). In the wake of the Sheppard case, many
states adopted rules to limit extrajudicial statements by
lawyers. The Court considered a First Amendment
challenge to one of these rules mid concluded in a
divided decision that many existing rules were unconstitutionally vague (Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030, 1991). The rule in effect in most jurisdictions
now prohibits a lawyer from making an extrajudicial
statement that will have a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."
W. BRADLEY WENDEL
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DISCIPLINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
FOR EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY
A public employee's right to free speech under the
First Amendment is not unlimited and employers
have the right to discipline employees for expressive
activity under certain circu111stances (Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 1968). The employer has an interest in ensuring that its etnployees do
not under1nine its operations or ll1terfere with acco1nplishment of its objectives. At the same time, employees do not give up their constitutional iights when
they accept govern1nent employn1ent. Indeed, government employees may play a particularly important role
in enlightening the public about governmental operations by contributing to public debate and alerting the
public about potential wrongdoing. Thus, the courts
have developed a test for determining when public
employers can discipline their employees for expressive
activity.
The threshold requirement for protected speech is
that it must relate to a matter of public concern. If
speech relates to an etnployee's private grievance,
discipline based on the speech does not implicate the
First Atnendment. (For further infor1nation, see Matters of Public Concern Standard in Free Speech
Cases.) In addition, even if the speech addresses matters of public concern, when the en1ployee's speech
rights are outweighed by the disruption that the speech
causes to the operations of gover111nent, the e1nployer
can discipline the en1ployee for speech. The 111ore central the speech is to matters of concern to the public,
the n1ore disruptive to govern1nent operations it n1ust
be in order to justify discipline. The impact of the
speech on discipline, working relationships, work performance, and government operations is a significant
consideration in weighing the government's interests

DISCOVERY MATERIALS IN COURT PROCEEDINGS

(Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 1987). In the 2005
term (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d. 1168, 9th Cir.
2004, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395, 2005), the Supreme
Court had to decide whether an employee who brings
to light suspected wrongdoing in speech required by
job duties is protected from discipline, thus further
refining the balancing test.
In son1e cases, the govern111ent disputes that discipline was motivated by the employee's protected
speech, asserting a lawful basis for the discipline. To
prevail on a constitutional clain1, the e1nployee inust
prove that the protected speech was a n1otivating
factor in the einployer's decision to discipline
(Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 1977). The employee must show
that the person who 1nade the decision was aware of
the speech. In addition, proof of actual n1otivation is
necessary; this can involve evidence such as the tin1ing
of the discipline in relation to the speech, employer
unhappiness with the speech, or the pretextual nature
of the einployer's asserted reason for the discipline.
If the employee proves that the speech motivated
the employer, the employer can avoid liability by
showing that it would have disciplined the employee
for legithnate reasons even if the etnployee had
not engaged in the protected speech. When there is
disagreen1ent about what the en1ployee actually said,
the e1nployer nlay rely on what it reasonably and in
good faith believes was said in deciding whether
to discipline the employee (Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 1994). To ensure that it acts reasonably, the
wise en1ployer will investigate prior to discipline \vhen
en1ployee staten1ents n1ay have First Ainendment
protection.
ANN

c. HODGES
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DISCOVERY MATERIALS IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS
In civil as well as crin1inal court proceedings, discovery serves as a tool whereby all parties to an action
can discover, before a trial on the nlatter's merits,
precisely what evidence will be offered at the trial.
The discovery process provides each party to an action the opportunity to examine the evidence that will
be used against them as well as to find or discover the
evidence to be used in their favor. The rules of procedure place few limits on the ldnds of evidence subject
to discovery, whereas the rules of evidence place
significant lin1its on the adn1issibility of discovered
evidence at trial. For exainple, a deposition transcript
111ay be used, in whole or in part, but only pursuant to
the applicable rules of evidence governing admissibility and the applicable rules of procedure that set out
particular conditions precedent to their use.
Because the facts conceded in a party's responses to
requests for ad1nission are not subject to dispute at trial,
these responses are co111:1-no11ly used for docu1nent authentication, for iinpeach111ent purposes, or as propf of
the existence or nonexistence of an ele1nent of a claiin.
Physical exa1ninations can be used to prove the extent of
a pmty's injuries. Expert witnesses may be called to give
their conclusions or opinions regarding information,
likely obtained through discovery, provided to them
before trial. In court proceedings, discovery is an equalizer, ai111ing all parties to an action access to the same
information before it is presented to the trier of fact.
KATHRYN
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